Watching the International Crimes Tribunal from London by Zeitlyn, Benjamin
 
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic
Journal 
9 | 2014
Imagining Bangladesh: Contested Narratives








Association pour la recherche sur l'Asie du Sud (ARAS)
 
Electronic reference
Benjamin Zeitlyn, « Watching the International Crimes Tribunal from London », South Asia
Multidisciplinary Academic Journal [Online], 9 | 2014, Online since 22 July 2014, connection on 01 May
2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/samaj/3711  ; DOI : 10.4000/samaj.3711 
This text was automatically generated on 1 May 2019.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0
International License.





1 In early 2013 the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) in Bangladesh began sentencing
alleged  war  criminals  from  the  country’s  1971  Liberation  War.1 The  trials,  ensuing
protests and counter protests dominated the news and conversations in Bangladesh and
among British Bangladeshis in London. In London the debate was polarised and revealed
newly energised political fault lines. Suddenly everyone was talking about Bangladeshi
politics, new websites sprang up and social media was full of debate and comment on
Bangladesh.  Discourses  emanating from London were a direct  challenge to dominant
discourses  on  current  affairs  in  Bangladesh  and  the  events  of  1971.  A  lot  of  these
subjectivities were also associated with particular forms of Islamist political activity that
have emerged in London in recent years.
2 Through an examination of responses to the ICT, and the associated protests in Shahbagh
and Shapla Chottor, this article describes the ways that politics in Bangladesh is regarded
in London. By highlighting responses of people in London and connecting these with
socio-economic and political events, the paper makes two connected arguments. The first
is that the influence of Islamist movements can be seen in many responses of British
Bangladeshis. This involves positionality towards events formed through the application
of  Islamist  ideas  to  developing  events,  what  DeHanas  (2013b)  refers  to  as  ‘elastic
orthodoxy’,  and  tools  and  approaches  for  engaging  with  dominant  discourses.
Experiences of British Muslims during the ‘War on Terror’, pervasive Islamophobia and
representations of Muslims in mainstream media, have encouraged a critical approach to
dominant discourses and narratives among British Bangladeshis. This has influenced the
methods  used  to  challenge  dominant  discourses  about  1971  and  recent  events  in
Bangladesh. The second argument is that events in Bangladesh have led to a surge of
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interest  in Bangladesh and in 1971 as  a  historical  event among British Bangladeshis.
Although it is difficult to quantify either the relative popularity of different discourses
among a large and diverse group of people, or change over time, the recent emergence in
London of on-line activism supporting a particular political position, is easier to evidence.
3 Transnational  activities  have  long  been  identified  as  a  site  of  diasporas  politically
engaging  in  the  politics  of  their  homeland.  Technology  has  played  a key  role  in
facilitating diaspora engagement in politics (Vertovec 1999). Vertovec (1999) notes that
diaspora political engagement takes many forms and positions, such as cosmopolitan,
nationalist,  anti-nationalist  and  reactionary  ethno-nationalism.  Østergaard-Nielsen
(2003)  reviews  approaches  to  understanding  transnational  political  activity,  and
distinctions made by authors between ‘broad’ and ‘narrow’, ‘core’ and ‘expanded’ modes.
The narrow/core modes of activity indicate serious, regular activity, whereas the broad
and expanded modes indicate occasional  engagement.  Østergaard-Nielsen argues that
transnational political orientation is linked to the type of migration, the length of stay
and migrants’  structural position in the destination country. However, these patterns
shift  over  time  as  transnational  orientations  replace  migrant  subjectivities  and  the
receiving country’s political influences exert their influence.
4 Østergaard-Nielsen explains how, when opposing a state that is allied to the destination
country, transnational political actors appeal to international organisations such as the
UN  or  NGOs.  Transnational  political  networks  seek  to  co-opt  NGOs  at  national  and
international levels. These strategies not only adapt to the local political environment,
but  also  adopt  and  deploy  Western  liberal  norms  of  democracy  and  human  rights.
Transnational political activists can often act with freedom that would not be tolerated in
their countries of origin, and consider themselves as having access to objective sources of
information unavailable in the country of origin. However, it is not always clear to what
extent  these  transnational  networks  represent  groups  in  the  country  of  origin
(Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). Many of these patterns of political activity are observable in
the responses of British Bangladeshis to recent events in Bangladesh.
5 This article is based on a series of interviews,  participation in public meetings about
Bangladesh and data drawn from websites and social media. Focusing on website and
social media activity illustrates the way in which transnational engagement by British
Bangladeshis  has  emerged  and  taken  shape.  Perhaps  moving  from occasional,  broad
interest to regular, narrow engagement, the analysis focuses on five websites and their
associated social media accounts. These are summarised in the table below. All the sites
were set up in spring 2013, several using easy-to-use Wordpress software. The websites
are either registered in London or use popular website hosting services such as GoDaddy
and Identity  Protect  to  hide  the  website  creator’s  identity.  The  websites  provide  no
identifying names, organisations or addresses, and articles published on them are usually
anonymous. 
6 Table 1. British Bangladeshi Political Websites
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7 Interviews were conducted with twelve London-based British Bangladeshis to identify
and understand discourses. Seven of these interviews were conducted in person and five
by e-mail. To reflect a range of experiences and perspectives, the sample was selected
purposely to include people thought to epitomise each of the main political positions in
Bangladeshi politics, which are described below (Lewis 2011, Ali 2010, BX 2013). Eight
members of the sample were born in the UK and four in Bangladesh. However, of those
born in Bangladesh, two came to the UK in early childhood. The sample contained both
men (7) and women (5), and ages ranged from in their twenties to fifties.
8 The paper is the result of discussion and debate, rather than a funded research project. As
a small qualitative study, the sample and discussion used here are not intended to be
representative. The interviews are used to identify discourses rather than comment upon
the prevalence of one set of beliefs over another. The paper reports on English language
blogs and press, and responses of British Bangladeshis to Bangla material. The focus is
upon contemporary British Bangladeshi subjectivities in London, so it focuses on trends
in social media and debate rather than trying to capture everything that is happening.
Due to the fast moving nature of events in Bangladesh, the research also represents a
moment in time which may be eclipsed by further developments.
 
Background
9 Bangladesh and British Bangladeshis are what Anderson (2006) characterises as ‘imagined
communities’. Gupta (2007) describes how Bengali intelligentsia, such as Rabindranath
Tagore,  deployed the notion of  ‘desh’  (country,  land or  homeland)  in the nineteenth
century to unify Bengalis and connect them with a particular geography, in resistance to
the  colonial  division  of  Bengal.  Influenced  by  European  ideas  of  nationhood  but
combining  these  with  an  emerging  Bengali  tradition,  desh was  used  as  a  way  of
transcending geographical and social boundaries to create a nation (Gupta 2007: 182).
Bangladesh was imagined based on these cultural roots and a shared language, which
became a symbol of resistance to the Pakistani government in Bangladesh’s independence
struggle.
10 The ‘International Crimes Tribunal’ in Bangladesh refers to the trial of a group of men
alleged to have committed war crimes during Bangladesh’s  independence struggle in
1971. Bengalis in East Pakistan fought against a Pakistani military regime that sought to
prevent the implementation of the 1970 election results. During the nine month long war,
according to one estimate, half a million people died (Curlin et al. 1976). Millions of people
fled across the border to India, and many thousands of women were raped. The Pakistani
military and their local allies specifically targeted Bengali intellectuals and Hindus and
rape was used as a weapon of war (Linton 2010, Ali 2010: 51). Histories of horrors of the
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war and the eventual  victory of  the Mukti  Bahini (freedom fighters)  have become an
integral part of nationalism in Bangladesh.
11 The  Pakistani  military  formed  auxiliary  units  of  collaborators  whose  members  have
become  known  as  Razakars. They  are  associated  with  many  of  the  worst  atrocities
committed in the war (Linton 2010: 198, Lewis 2011:71). Members of these groups and the
political  party  Jamaat-e-Islami  are  alleged  to  have  participated  in  the  murder  of
intellectuals (Linton 2010: 199). This is the dominant discourse on Bangladesh and 1971,
one that is central to the construction of nationalism in Bangladesh and particularly to
the Awami League party, which led the liberation movement. A number of studies, such
as Bose’s work on the war (2011a, 2011b), have challenged these discourses and accounts
of the scale and nature of atrocities in 1971. Debates centre around issues such as the use
of the word ‘genocide’ to describe Pakistani military atrocities and on the number of
people killed in the war. 
12 The legacy of this struggle is an Awami League party that sees itself as the party of the
independence struggle, as a secular Bengali nationalist party. The main opposition to the
Awami  League  is  the  Bangladesh  Nationalist  Party  (BNP)  who  stress  a  Bangladeshi
nationalism that combines Bengali  and Islamic identities and Islamist political groups
such as Jamaat-e-Islami who believe in a greater role for Islam and Shariah (religious law)
in  politics  and  society  (BX  2013).  Jamaat-e-Islami  are  the  largest  Islamist  party  in
Bangladesh and have in the past been in government in coalitions with both other major
parties. The party was banned from participating in the recent elections in Bangladesh on
the grounds that it opposed both secularism and the formation of Bangladesh.
13 Nationalism in Bangladesh draws on the Liberation War as a powerful and traumatic
mythology of  the nation’s  birth.  The shared cultural  roots,  language and history are
important  components  of  nationalisms  everywhere  and  of  the  way  Bangladesh  is
imagined today (Anderson 2006: 44). Nationalism, as Renan (1992 [1882]) says, involves
both shared histories and shared forgetting (Hylland Eriksen 1993). The Liberation War,
Mukti  Bahini,  and the role of Jamaat-e-Islami are part of the national mythology,  and
much eulogised  in  books,  print  media  and  film in  Bangladesh.  However,  the  shared
history and shared forgetting about the events of 1971 are contested and so too, as a
result,  is  nationalism in Bangladesh.  To use Anderson’s  terms,  the community  that  is
imagined by competing groups does not extend the ‘deep horizontal comradeship’ to all
who  now  count  themselves  as  Bangladeshi  (Anderson  2006:  7).  As  we  will  see,  this
turbulent  history  and  partisan  political  scene  has  an  enduring  impact  upon current
events in Bangladesh and the way these are regarded in London. New communities, new
media and new mythologies challenge dominant discourses.
 
British Bangladeshi politics and the Umma
14 There were 447,201 British citizens of Bangladeshi origin recorded in the British Census
in  2011,  50%  of  them  lived  in  London  and  18%  in  Tower  Hamlets  (ONS  2012).  The
proportion of British Bangladeshis who do not live in Tower Hamlets or inner London
appears to be increasing. British Bangladeshis are a relatively deprived group in the UK.
More than one in three live in a deprived area (Jivraj & Khan 2013). Over half of British
Bangladeshi children live in poverty (Platt 2009). 68% of British Bangladeshis live in low-
income,  often  overcrowded  households  and  rely  more  on  benefits  than  any  other
community (Ofsted 2004: 5). One manifestation of this disadvantage, until recently, was
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relatively  low average  scores  in  examination  results.  This,  however,  is  changing.  By
2012/13 British Bangladeshi performance at GCSE was higher than the national average.
This  is  part  of  a  trend which has  seen the  proportion of  British  Bangladeshi  pupils
achieving five A-Cs in GCSEs rise from below 20% in 1992 to 85% in 2013 (The Economist
2007, Department for Education 2014).
15 Many analyses of British Bangladeshis in London comment upon the divisions between
secular groups and Islamists, between Sufi or Barelvi Muslims linked to the Brick Lane
Mosque and what some observers call ‘revivalist Islam’ or ‘new Islam’ associated with a
range of Islamist ideas,  including those of Jamaat-e-Islami in the nearby East London
Mosque. Accounts illustrate the extent to which various Islamist groups have grown in
popularity  and influence  among young British  Bangladeshis.  These  divisions  take  on
generational aspects (with British born generations embracing Islamist movements) and
influence  political  positionality  (Gardner  &  Shukur  1994,  DeHanas  2013a,  2013b,
Alexander 2013, Glynn 2002, Eade & Garbin 2002, Hussain 2007, Kibria 2008, Rozario 2011,
The  Economist 2013c).  While  ‘revivalist’  or  ‘new’  Islam  are  widely  used  in  academic
literature to describe these movements, they are not terms that British Bangladeshis use
regularly, so this paper uses the term ‘Islamist’ to refer to groups that seek a central role
for Islam in politics.
16 Sayyid (2000) connects rising Islamic identification with two processes of ‘decentring’, the
decentring of the west and the decentring of the peripheral nation state. This describes
British Bangladeshis, in whom attachment to the idea of Bangladesh and the contested
histories that have built up around 1971 is not as strong as it is among many who have
grown up in Bangladesh. British Bangladeshis have not been so involved in the shared
histories and processes of imagining through the media and education in Bangladesh that
have created Bangladesh as a nation. Accounts of young British Bangladeshi views of
Bangladeshi politics and 1971 from the years immediately after 9/11 report it being seen
as ‘irrelevant’ and a ‘joke’, rejected for being so corrupt (Glynn 2002, 2006). This group
has also become ambivalent about Britain due to experiences of Islamophobia and racism
and opposition to British foreign policy in the ‘War on Terror’. These rejections of/by
nations and nationalisms emerged in a mutually reinforcing way with Islamist groups. 
17 Eade and Garbin (2002) describe how younger British Born Bangladeshis have a greater
tendency to reject Bengali nationalism and orient their interest towards the notion of an
Islamic Umma (community) (Eade & Garbin 2002: 139, Begum & Eade 2005). New media on
the internet and television channels help to create this transnational community and
sense of belonging to a global Islamic community (Kibria 2008). The popularity of Islamist
subjectivities in London has been set  within a social  and political  context of  fevered
interest in and prejudice against Muslims in the years after 9/11. Negative portrayals of
Muslims in the British media contributed to this and turned many British Muslims away
from mainstream media, encouraging a search for alternative sources of information to
challenge dominant discourses (Ahmad 2006).
18 DeHanas (2013a) describes revivalist Islam as ‘deculturated’, so that it is seen as ‘pure’ and
timeless,  without  the  syncretic  influences  of  ‘Bengali  culture’.  The  strength  and
popularity  of  these  ideas  represent  a  victory  for  the  East  London Mosque’s  Islamist
influenced interpretation of Islam among British Bangladeshis (DeHanas 2013b). The idea
of  ‘elastic  orthodoxy’  DeHanas (2013b)  describes how,  influenced by the East  London
Mosque and other institutions, young British Bangladeshis employ local interpretations
of Islam strategically in new contexts. It is this elastic orthodoxy that characterises many
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British Bangladeshi responses to recent events in Bangladesh. The next three sections
examine reactions to the ICT, Shahbagh and Hefazot-e-Islam2 to illustrate these issues.
 
The International Crimes Tribunal
19 The International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) was set up by the Bangladeshi government in
March 2010, based on an amended version of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act of
1973 to try those accused of crimes from the 1971 war (Linton 2010). The ICT has been
dogged by controversy since The Economist Magazine revealed that senior judges had been
corresponding with advisors abroad and members of the government about the cases (The
Economist 2012, 2013a).
20 Critics of the ICT question its motives, its existence, those who it is prosecuting and the
processes of the tribunal. They accuse the government of using it to settle political scores
(Jalil & Rahman 2011, Islam 2011). Other critiques centre on the debate over whether the
accused are ‘small fish’ and the perpetrators of the worst crimes are either dead or in
Pakistan  (The  Economist 2012,  Islam  2011).  Information  about  the  ICT  on  the  ‘
SaveBangladesh’ website exemplifies these critiques: 
The  current  Awami  League  government  established  the  ‘International  Crimes
Tribunal’  to  try  people  they  accused  of  committing  crimes  during  1971.  No
Pakistanis have come before the court, nor have any ruling Awami League leaders
who  supported  the  Pakistan-side  during  the  war,  or  even  those  who  publicly
committed  war  crimes  after  the  war.  The  only  people  in  the  dock  are  those
belonging  to  the  Jamaat-e-Islami  and  the  Bangladesh  National  Party  (Save
Bangladesh 2013a). 
21 Another critique does not question the motives or targeting of the ICT but is concerned
about due process in the way the tribunal has operated. This trend criticises the
standards of evidence and restrictions on the defence in the tribunal (The Economist 2012,
Bergman 2012).  Websites  such as  Feb28 host  detailed critiques  of  the ICT by defence
barristers:
Abdul Quader Mollah was convicted following a highly controversial trial in which
the  Presiding  Judge  was  removed  following  the  resignation  of  the  disgraced
Chairman as a consequence of the ‘Skypegate’ scandal. The defence were prevented
from  calling  witnesses  and  the  case  was  promptly  closed  by  the  Tribunal  and
rushed to judgment. Both the Tribunal and the Supreme Court have failed to apply
the law as it stood in 1971 and took judicial notice of contentious facts that were
not  in  evidence.  The defence were also  prevented on numerous occasions  from
having privileged communications with the accused. The countless defects in the
trial process and the numerous errors in law were so severe that they invalidate the
entire  judgment  and  any  conviction  amounts  to  a  miscarriage  of  justice  (Feb28
2013a).
22 Supporters of the ICT argue that it is necessary to continue the work that Mujib started
but could not complete—to seek justice for the collaboration and war crimes committed
during the war (Alam 2013)—and that it provides an opportunity for closure (Murshid
2013). However, the ICT is perceived by its critics not as a national process for justice and
closure but as a political process to destroy and discredit Jamaat-e-Islami and even Islam
itself (Islam 2011, Jalil & Rahman 2011). What was supposed to be a national process has
become  a  party  political  issue.  Political  divisions  are  represented  in  London.  Some
interviewees  perceived  the  ICT  as  having  been  a  success  so  far,  free  from  political
interference, but perhaps poorly publicised:
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So far the trial has gone without any kind of political involvement, but the process
has not been managed well politically. The government should have given the PR
side more thought (male, 33, migrated to London as a child).
23 Others highlighted the ‘indoctrination’ that had added to the problems of establishing the
‘truth’ of historical events. By this they referred to the dominant narratives on 1971 that
are  so  integral  to  nationalism in  Bangladesh.  This  respondent  felt  that  the  ICT  was
necessary but had been poorly run:
What do you think about the Bangladesh War Crimes Trial and the issues involved?
The trial should have taken place a long time ago, should have happened 40 years
ago. Now indoctrination for 40 years has made things worse. Bangladeshis need to
have closure on the issue but what has happened so far will not bring the matter to
a close.
How do you think the trial has gone so far?
The trial so far has been terrible. We don’t know how to undertake a fair trial, how
to conduct a fair trial. Gulam Azam and Sayedee3 are becoming shahids (martyrs)
(female, 28, born in London).
24 Others felt that the ICT itself was a grave injustice, used for political reasons and violated
existing legislation:
It is politically motivated and is a witch-hunt. This is a travesty of justice. There are
three  issues  involved.  1.  Oppress  the  political  opponent  2.  Try  to  gather  mass
support  by using freedom fighting sentiment.  3.  No intention to  try  actual  war
criminal  because  tri-country  Delhi  treaty4 will  not  allow  it  (male,  29,  born  in
Bangladesh).
25 The ICT has become a contentious political issue, which has led to three main types of
violence  in  Bangladesh.  Islamist  activists  associated  with  Jamaat-e-Islami  and  their
student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir, have been accused of attacks against religious and
ethnic minorities (The Economist 2013b, Ethirajan 2013), although they have denied any
involvement.  In  addition,  the  same  groups  or  allies  have  been  accused  of  attacking
activists, bloggers and online activists who they label ‘atheists’. Several so-called ‘atheist
bloggers’  and  journalists  have  been  murdered  or  imprisoned  and  newspapers  and
television channels have been shut down by the government (HRW 2013, Tripathi 2014).
In addition, Islamist groups including Jamaat-e-Islami, Islami Chatra Shibir and Hefazot-
e-Islam have been in conflict with members of the security forces, most notably in late
February and early May 2013, and there have been numerous deaths of activists and some
members of the security forces (The Economist 2013b). 




27 On 5 February 2013, the secretary general of Jamaat-e-Islami, Abdul Quader Mollah, was
found guilty of participating in and aiding the murder and rape of unarmed civilians by
the  ICT.  He  was  sentenced  to  life  imprisonment,  to  the  surprise  of  many  who  had
expected a death sentence. As he left the tribunal, Mollah flashed a triumphant ‘V-sign’,
which was seen by some as a celebration of having avoided the death penalty. The verdict
led activists and bloggers to call for protests demanding the death sentence for Mollah
and people began to gather at Shahbagh, a road junction in Dhaka (Murshid 2013: 13).
Jamaat-e-Islami and its student wing threatened to attack the protest and were then
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blamed  for  the  murder  of  a  prominent  blogger  and  activist  (Murshid  2013:  14).
Subsequently,  the protesters,  who were named after the place,  ‘Shahbagh’,  adopted a
wider set of demands linked to the trial, but also explicitly in opposition to Jamaat-e-
Islami (Ahmed 2013).
28 The protest at Shahbagh was peaceful and law enforcement agencies allowed the protest
to continue,  although some protesters were hostile  to Awami League politicians who
came to speak to the crowds (Hassan 2013, Quayum 2013, Anam 2013). Shahbagh seems to
represent a contradictory secular progressive movement that seeks to usher in a new
form of popular secular politics, and at the same time, make reference to the ‘spirit of
1971’, a nostalgic attachment to the Liberation War. For some, the war is still not over and
the impunity of criminals from 1971 have to be tackled once and for all. The demand for
the death penalty among Bangladesh’s liberals is an example of this contradiction (Zeitlin
2013).
29 Like the tribunal, Shahbagh elicits a range of views among British Bangladeshis. Protests
in solidarity with Shahbagh were held around the world. When protests sympathetic to
Shahbagh were held at Altab Ali Park in east London, counter protests led to ugly scenes
(Cohen  2013).  Attitudes  about  the  role  of  religion  in  politics  and  nationalism  and
Bangladeshi party politics divide Bangladeshis in London as they do elsewhere. What is
different in London is the relative influence of Jamaat-e-Islami and other Islamist groups.
30 Among supporters of Shahbagh, the protests are considered politically neutral and a good
example of peaceful protest:
Shahbagh started with Qader Mollah’s V-sign. This was an important movement,
aimed to sort out corruption. It was a neutral and non-political movement, which
was for creating an open society and they wanted an independent country. They
wanted trial, justice and carried out a peaceful protest. Bangladesh can undertake
peaceful protest,  an example to the rest of the countries (male,  33,  migrated to
London as a child).
31 Some  British  Bangladeshis,  although  they  were inclined  to  support  the  Shahbagh
protests,  found the protests  and counter protests  rather confusing,  and felt  that  the
demands for hanging by Shahbagh protesters were disturbing.
I  went  to  Altab  Ali  Park  when  there  were  two  different  demonstrations.  The
Shahbagh supporters on one side and the Jamaat on the other side. I got confused at
people  coming  together  demanding  hanging.  I  also  found  some  of  the  images
coming  from  the  Shahbagh  movement  very  disturbing—kids  saying  we  want
hanging—this was indoctrination. There were both positive and negative images. I
would  feel  more  comfortable  if  they  were  calling  for  justice  and  not  hanging
(female, 38, born in Bangladesh).
32 Others utterly rejected the reasoning, methods, politics and ethics of Shahbagh, calling it
the ‘most stupid movement in Bengali history, ever’ (male, 32, born in London). These
views are echoed on the websites established in London shortly after the emergence of
Shahbagh,  seemingly  to  directly  challenge  it.  This  is  the  ‘SaveBangladesh’  website’s
explanation about Shahbagh:
The ‘Shahbag’ movement has been compared to Egypt’s Tahrir Square. In Tahrir,
they called for freedom and democracy, in Shahbag, an area in Dhaka, ‘protestors’
are demanding the death penalty and banning of political parties. They began their
protest because one of the accused, Abdul Qader Mollah, was not given the death
sentence. As a result of the protest, the government rushed through legislation to
overturn the sentence to a death penalty. This ‘movement’ has the backing of the
government. This is a Maoist, Cultural Revolution. You only need to look at the fact
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that Shahbag ‘protestors’ are allowed to protest by the police, while the very same
police have killed and prevented those protesting against what is there for all to
see: grave injustice (Save Bangladesh 2013b).
33 Positions  on  the  ICT  and  Shahbagh  were  largely  consistent  among  the  research
participants. One group was positive about the tribunal and Shahbagh, seeing them as the
necessary completion of the liberation war. Another group saw the need for tribunals and
was moved by the outpouring of patriotism and emotion in Shahbagh, but found both the
tribunal and Shahbagh morally and politically flawed. A third group, reflected in the
British  Bangladeshi  web  activism,  rejected  the  tribunal  and  Shahbagh  as  secular
‘fanaticism’ or ‘fascism’, Awami League politics and an attack against Islam. 
34 These three discourses inform the positions of the three political positions in Bangladesh.
The  discourses  correspond  with  different  iterations  of  the  imagined  community  of
Bangladesh.  The Awami League and participants  in the Shahbagh protests  imagine a
Bangladesh that does not include Islamists and forces that did not support the liberation
struggle.  Shahbagh enjoyed widespread support in Bangladesh in early 2013, while in
London  Islamist  narratives  were  relatively  more  influential  (The  Economist  2013c).
Analysis of social media use during the Shahbagh protests illustrates the extent to which
British-based users of Twitter opposed the Shahbagh movement while Bangladesh and
US-based users were generally more supportive of the movement (Analysing Social Network




35 In April 2013 a conservative Islamic group called Hefazot-e-Islam gave Sheikh Hasina’s
government  a  list  of  13  ‘demands’  (Mustafa  2013).  They  gave  the  government  an
ultimatum of three weeks to implement the demands, threatening to lay siege to Dhaka
and overthrow the government if the demands were not met. The theme of many of the
demands is for a more central role for Islam in the country’s constitution, education
system, media, society and law. There are also appeals for protection for Islamic scholars
and madrassa students and a demand to declare the Ahmadiyya minority as non-Muslims.
Several of the demands directly or indirectly referenced Shahbagh, demanding: an end to
‘candle lit vigils’, the punishment of atheists and ‘anti-Islam bloggers’.
36 The Hefazot-e-Islam movement’s  demands fall  into four categories.  The first  is  for  a
greater prominence of a particular conservative interpretation of Islam in society and
politics,  including specific  reference  to  punishing ‘atheists’,  blasphemers,  and people
involved  in  Shahbagh.  This  also  includes  specific  reference  to  gender  relations,  the
education system, NGOs, the media, public sculptures, and Christian missionaries. The
second makes reference to the perceived persecution of Islamic scholars and madrassa
students. The movement is said to originate in Quomi madrassas, religious schools that
are  independent  from  the  state.  The  third  category  of  demand  distinguishes  the
interpretation of Islam of the Hefazot-e-Islam movement from that of the persecuted
Ahmadiyya minority in Bangladesh who they demand be officially declared non-Muslims
by the government. The fourth category makes specific reference to Shahbagh, which
they are clearly opposed to. The categories range from the desire for a greater role for
religion in the state, to the protection of religious scholars from attack, and finally to
identifying two particular groups of people as enemies of the Hefazot-e-Islam movement:
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Ahmadiyyas  and  protesters  at  Shahbagh  (Daily  Star  2013a).  The  Hefazot-e-Islam
movement is therefore seen as a counter reaction to the Shahbagh protests. The imagined
community of Bangladesh promoted by this movement is one without Ahmadiyyas, and
without secular political groups. 
37 The government did not meet the 13 demands before the ultimatum, and so the ‘siege of
Dhaka’ happened. Hefazot-e-Islam’s hundreds of thousands of followers came to Dhaka
and ignored several requests and warnings from the government to leave Dhaka. During
the day there was widespread violence in many parts of Dhaka, with vehicles, buildings,
and the offices of the Awami League and Communist party of Bangladesh being burned
down or attacked (Daily Star 2013b). At night many of the protesters gathered in Shapla
Chottor to pray, sleep and defiantly stay their until their demands were met, despite
government and security forces’ orders to leave. 
38 What followed was a well co-ordinated attack on the protesters by thousands of police
and paramilitary forces as they slept in the early hours of 6 May. Accounts of the event
are strongly contested along political lines. Here I make no claim to have any access or
privileged insights into the ‘truth’ of events. The focus is on the ways in which these
narratives  and  discourses  are  analysed  and  deployed  in  London.  By  morning  many
thousands of protesters had been cleared,  by force,  from the area.  Press reports and
human rights organisations allege that between 24 and 61 people died (Odhikar 2013,
Bergman & Foyez 2013). 
39 The  five  websites  discussed  here  have  accompanying  social  media  accounts  with
Facebook, Twitter and sometimes YouTube accounts that were set up in spring 2013.
Immediately,  the  events  were  labelled  a  ‘massacre’  and  ‘genocide’ by  British-based
internet activists using websites and social media. Indeed, some of these websites and
social media accounts appear to have been set up specifically to publicise and cover the
events of  5 and 6 May.  Many of them contain specific references to Islam, construct
political events in Bangladesh as an attack on Muslims and appeal to all Muslims to join
their campaign. There is an explicit attempt to create an alternative narrative of events
from the mainstream media. The Feb28 website includes the following description:
28  February  2013  marked  the  day  on  which  the  people  of  Bangladesh  rose  up
against  the  Awami  League  regime  in  an  effort  to  challenge  its  brutality  and
viciousness towards Muslim citizens of Bangladesh and in particular Muslims and
Islamic  scholars.  The  Feb28  Justice  for  Bangladesh  movement  came  about  in
response to this escalating crisis that has engulfed Bangladesh.
It  aims to  expose the tyranny and anti-Islamic  hatred of  the oppressive  Awami
League regime and is dedicated to bringing you fresh and unbiased news on the
struggle of the Bangladeshi people (Feb28 2013b).
40 These are good examples of the elastic orthodoxy of Islamists. Using the local orthodoxy,
these  accounts  construct  the  Awami  League  government  as  an  ‘atheist’  movement
attacking Muslims in general. A Twitter account called ‘@Shapla_Chottor’ was set up on 5
May and calls for revolution in Bangladesh, attacks Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League,
and has the descriptor ‘Raise your voice against the atheist’. Hasina is described in tweets
from @Shapla_Chottor as a ‘non-Muslim’ and Sheikh Mujib as a ‘Hindu’. Responses to
these accounts included tweets such as: "This is a time for Muslims no matter who they
are  to  unite"  #opbangladesh  #feb28info”  specifically  referencing  the  Feb28  website.
Immediately before the events of 5 and 6 May, social media accounts from London were
calling for revolution, predicting trouble and launching a denial of service attacks on
Bangladeshi government and press websites. On 4 May, publicising this, OpBangladesh
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tweeted: ‘Govt of Hasina, be afraid... Be VERY afraid, We give you a chance to take your
wealth & run a way. #OpBangladesh’ along with the following picture: 
 
Figure 1: ‘International Wake-up call’5
41 In the days after 5 and 6 May, social media was used extensively, with hundreds of videos
and photos uploaded; there were further calls for revolution in Bangladesh and appeals to
activists and media to either join their campaign or publicise the violence occurring in
Bangladesh. The Feb28 website calls Sheikh Hasina ‘lady Hitler’, in part of what appears to
be a coordinated campaign to label Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League as ‘fascists’. 
42 The British websites and social media accounts draw on a similar set of discourses to
challenge  the  dominant  narratives  about  Bangladesh.  They  promote  an  Islamist  or
Jamaat-e-Islami interpretation of events, are very hostile towards the Awami League, and
reject  dominant  narratives  about  current  events  in  Bangladesh  and  1971.  Using  the
hashtags  #Blacknight,  #BanglaSpring,  #SaveBangladesh  and  #LadyHitler,  a  chorus  of
mainly British voices waged a cyber campaign to challenge secular and Awami League
narratives.  They have a particular discourse in common, one in which the Hefazot-e-
Islam protesters were peaceful,  religious victims of a ‘fascist’  ‘secular fundamentalist’
Awami League who had murdered them in their thousands (the numbers 2,000-3,000 are
regularly cited on these websites) and tried to destroy the evidence (Brethren of the Black
Lotus 2013). Dominant discourses are attached and new mythologies are created through
this work.
43 Hefazot-e-Islam clearly have support among British Bangladeshis, and this was reflected
in the interviews: 
Hefazot  movement  is  the  sentiment  of  peace  loving  Islamic  sentiment  but  the
western world will not accept it’ (male, 29, born in Bangladesh).
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44 The narrative of events promoted in social media and by the groups mentioned above was
repeated by interviewees: 
What do you think about the Hefazot-e-Islam movement?
They have the right to protest, I agree with about 11 of their 13 points. They were
massacred terribly.  They captured the public imagination. We lack sophisticated
Islamic leaders able to guide our people through issues of social justice in a way
that brings everyone together. I wish Hefazot safety and improvement (male, 32,
born in London).
45 Another respondent reported on their family in Bangladesh’s support for Hefazot-e-Islam
(despite not ‘practicing Islam very well’).  She also reported the claim that 2,000-3,000
people  died  at  Shapla  Chottor.  This  respondent  believed  that  there  was  Indian
involvement in the events and explicitly juxtaposed Hefazot-e-Islam with Shahbagh :
I  had reports that when Hefazot movement started many villages in Bangladesh
were so happy that people bought up watermelons to celebrate by eating together
and this caused a shortage of watermelons. 
When  Hefazot  started  I  started  to  feel  hopeful.  They  started  to  take  on  the
government. Hefazot is not against women’s leaderships as such as they have voted
in elections for the two women in the past.
My family in Bangladesh is supportive of Hefazot and they hate Shahbagh. Even if
they do not practise Islam very well they love and support the Hefazot for the way
they stood up against the psychopath Hasina.
3,000 murdered—I know people who were personally there. When government say
11 people died I know people who were there, definitely, 2,000-3,000 people died.
Some of  the  Bangladeshi  police  were  given  instructions  in  Hindi—Indians  were
there. The Indian Army was brought in as a back up. Hasina is a razakar to India
(female, 28, born in London).
46 A few respondents indicated opposition to the demands of Hefazot-e-Islam, and described
them as rather politically naïve. Some press reports describe the movement as being a
front for, or having been manipulated by, Jamaat-e-Islami:
What do you think about the Hefazot-e-Islam movement? 
It  is  laced with some unfortunate  demands,  and sweeping accusations about  its
position has meant that it’s become complicated, and perhaps the movement is not
really ready for the political arena (male, 28, came to UK as a child).
47 There was no hostility or anger towards Hefazot-e-Islam expressed by the interviewees.
The sample is not representative, but it illustrates a difference from the feelings of many
‘Western’ and Bangladeshi journalists and analysts and it is different from mainstream
opinion in Bangladesh, which still largely subscribes to the dominant discourse described
earlier.  Press  reports  in  ‘Western’  and  Bangladeshi  English  language  press  present
Hefazot-e-Islam as a dangerous, atavistic movement that will send Bangladesh back to the
‘dark ages’, mainly due to their stance on women (Mustafa 2013, Daily Star 2013b). 
48 In the interviews and in blog postings, the Hefazot-e-Islam movement was juxtaposed
with Shahbagh, the two being seen as representing rural and urban constituencies and
different socio-economic groups and as being exemplary of the divide in Bangladeshi
politics  and  society.  In  an  article  on  the  Kichuri  blog,  the  author  ‘Londoni’  (British
Bangladeshi) writes about the contested narratives about Hefazot-e-Islam and their 13
point demands. The author specifically critiques mainstream media coverage of events
but  offers  a  more  nuanced interpretation  than  the  simple  divide  between  ‘secular’
Shahbagh and ‘conservative’ Hefazot-e-Islam:
Such demands have already been seized upon by people like the Guardian’s Jason
Burke. His recent report on the Long March describes the Shahbag protestors as
Watching the International Crimes Tribunal from London
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 9 | 2014
12
‘young moderates’, moderates who call for death penalties and banning of political
parties,  contrasting  them favourably  to  the  Long Marchers.  Mr Burke,  who has
covered  Afghanistan  and  Pakistan  with  some  nuance  in  the  past,  also  fails  to
mention  the  controversy  and  scandal  that  Bangladesh’s  International  Crimes
Tribunal is embroiled in (Londoni 2013).
49 One  of  the  interviewees  explained  how  recent  events  in  Bangladesh  had  affected
relationships  between British Bangladeshis  and Bangladesh.  The campaigns  on social
media were aimed mainly at an English speaking,  educated audience and encouraged
people  to  apply  their  London-learned  Islamist  subjectivity  to  current  events  in
Bangladesh. Constructing events in Bangladesh as an attack on Muslims presents events
as a conflict between atheists and Muslims. It also invoked the mentality of the ‘War on
Terror’ years when British Bangladeshis felt that they were a suspect community because
they  were  Muslims.  Perhaps  this  was  an  element  that  re-engaged  some  British
Bangladeshis  with  Bangladeshi  politics  through  a  certain  lens,  as  the  following
interviewee explains, speaking about the violence of 6 May:
Those of us who care were heartbroken at the massacre. I  think it puts a lot of
people off caring about the people there. But it also provides a point of access for
people losing their roots (male, 32, born in London).
50 Just as 9/11 led to a surge of interest in the meaning and role of Islam in a soul searching
British Bangladeshi population (Glynn 2002), the ICT and events in Bangladesh have led to
a renewed interest in 1971, the birth of Bangladesh and Bengal's history in general. The
sudden  emergence  of  new  websites,  social  media  accounts  and  political  activity  is
evidence of this. Both surges in interest led to conscious attempts to construct alternative
narratives  to those of  the mainstream media and government (Ahmad 2006).  This  is
explicitly  mentioned  in  several  of  the  websites  and  it  is  an  interesting  example  of
transnational political activity, what Glick Schiller and Fouron (2001) call ‘long distance
nationalism’, the feeling of belonging and involvement in the nation, for people who do
not live or have citizenship in that nation, through transnational connections.
 
Conclusion
51 Recent events in Bangladesh have captured the imaginations of  British Bangladeshis.
Interpretations of  events  differ  amongst  political  and  religious  groups  that  have
contrasting views of who is the victim and who is the aggressor. Bengali nationalists,
Awami League supporters,  secular and left wing groups see the ICT as the legitimate
conclusion of the Liberation War. Bangladeshi nationalists, represented by the BNP hold
views  about  the  ICT,  Shahbagh  and  Hefazot-e-Islam  that  are  similar  to  Islamist
interpretations, such as those of Jamaat-e-Islami. These may be influenced by ideology,
different histories and also the political position they hold in opposition to the governing
party. These interpretations of events, that are influential in London and appear to be
influenced by Islamists,  see the Awami League and mainstream media as persecuting
Islamists in Bangladesh and attacking Islam itself. 
52 The extent of the influence of Islamist groups among British Bangladeshis in London and
the reasons behind the phenomenon are unclear. One view is that this is a legacy of the
emergence in the last twenty-five years of Islam as an important source of identity among
British Bangladeshis. Islamist approaches represent an ‘alternative modernity’, offering
progress from the traditions of the village that is explicitly critical of ‘Western modernity’
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(Zeitlyn 2014). Some of the subjectivities and methods of resisting Islamophobia during
the ‘War on Terror’ years have been brought to bear in response to events in Bangladesh.
The  distrust  of  and  critique  of  mainstream media  and  government  discourses  bears
striking similarities with those of the ‘War on Terror’ years and draws upon some of the
same discourses challenging the misrepresentation of Muslims and Islam in the media.
This is a good example of the elastic orthodoxy that DeHanas (2013b) describes, where
local orthodoxies are used to interpret developing events in other places. Many British
Bangladeshis challenged the UK and US governments’ ‘War on Terror’ in the years after
9/11 and some have used the same methods to challenge dominant discourses about
recent events in Bangladesh (Begum & Eade 2005). 
53 Another  type  of  interpretation  is  that  the  deployment  of  ‘Western’  notions  of  due
process, human rights and international law by Human Rights Watch (2013b), Bergman
(2012),  The  Economist (2012)  and  lawyers  hired  by  the  defendants  in  the  ICT,  have
successfully critiqued the ICT. In addition, Sarmila Bose’s (2011a, 2011b) work on 1971 has
challenged  the  dominant  narratives  about  the  war.  These  critiques  have  gained
credibility among British Bangladeshis. Certainly a wider range of media and comment on
events in Bangladesh, often with transnational reach, has complicated narratives on/in
Bangladesh. The British Bangladeshis behind the transnational internet activism have
drawn upon these sources to bolster their critiques of dominant discourses and challenge
the shared mythology of nationalism(s) in Bangladesh. 
54 Transnational  political  activity  plays  a  key  role  in  critiquing  nationalism(s)  in
Bangladesh.  Broad,  occasional  interest  piqued  by  key  events  is  turned,  perhaps
temporarily, into narrow, focused and regular activism through these campaigns. These
efforts  and  recent  events  have  seen  a  renewed  interest  in  1971  and  contemporary
Bangladeshi politics among British Bangladeshis.
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NOTES
1. I wish to acknowledge the role of Dr. Muhammad Ahmedullah in this paper. He contributed
significantly to this research by conducting the interviews and developing the analysis presented
here.
2. The  name  Hefazot-e-Islam  (protector  of  Islam)  is  also  transliterated  as  Hifazat,  Hefazat,
Hefajat, Hefajote, and in numerous other ways.
3. Gulam Azam and Delwar  Hussain  Sayedee  are  defendants  in  the  ICT.  Both  are  leaders  of
Jamaat-e-Islami and both have been found guilty of crimes against humanity by the ICT.
4. A post Liberation War agreement between India, Bangladesh and Pakistan.
5. Source:  https://twitter.com/OpBangladesh/status/330690945404260352 (accessed
20/06/2014).
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challenge dominant discourses about Bangladesh’s Liberation War and contemporary politics. In
many cases these are related to or inspired by Islamic political movements that have become
influential among British Bangladeshis. 
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